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Abstract 
People spend a considerable amount of their time mentally simulating experiences other than the 
one in which they are presently engaged, as a means of distraction, coping, or preparation for the 
future. In this integrative review, we examine four (non-exhaustive) cases in which mentally 
simulating an experience serves a different function, as a substitute for the corresponding 
experience. In each case, mentally simulating an experience evokes similar cognitive, 
physiological, and/or behavioral consequences as having the corresponding experience in reality: 
(1) imagined experiences are attributed evidentiary value like physical evidence, (2) mental 
practice instantiates the same performance benefits as physical practice, (3) imagined 
consumption of a food reduces its actual consumption, and (4) imagined goal achievement 
reduces motivation for actual goal achievement. We organize these cases under a common 
superordinate category and discuss their different methodological approaches and explanatory 
accounts. Our integration yields theoretical and practical insights into when and why mentally 
simulating an experience serves as its substitute.    
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Mental Simulation as Substitute for Experience 
 
Much of life is spent thinking about experiences other than what one is doing. People 
frequently mentally simulate experiences by recalling episodes from their past, contemplating 
alternatives to their present circumstances, and anticipating or fantasizing about their future. 
Indeed, Americans explicitly divert their thoughts to experiences other than their present for 
more than a tenth of their day by watching television (American Time Use Survey, 2014). For 
roughly a third of their waking hours, the mind wanders away from the activity in which it is 
engaged (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Schooler et al., 2011). Much of this simulation is 
engaged in for its immediate hedonic, semantic, and functional benefits: to divert the mind 
toward more pleasure than is afforded by the present circumstances, regulate emotions, solve 
problems, or prepare for and anticipate the future (e.g., Buechel & Morewedge, 2013; Gollwitzer 
& Oettingen, 2012; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Kumar, Killingsworth, & Gilovich, 2014; 
MacInnis & Price, 1987; Markman, Klein, & Suhr, 2009; Morewedge & Hershfield, 2015; 
Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2008; Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, & Armor, 1998; Taylor & Schneider, 
1989). Simulations, however, do not only serve as mental representations of other past, present, 
and future experiences. The permeable boundary between thought and reality leads simulations 
to sometimes produce the same downstream consequences as the corresponding actual 
experiences. In this paper, we elucidate these effects by presenting four cases in which mental 
simulations act as substitutes for experience.  
 
MENTAL SIMULATIONS 
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Mental simulations are imitative episodic mental representations of one or a series of 
events (Taylor et al., 1998). In contrast to semantic representations, which are more general or 
abstract, mental simulations typically entail detailed mental representations of a specific real or 
hypothetical event (Szpunar, Spreng, & Schacter, 2014). Recalling a moment swimming in the 
ocean during a recent Mediterranean vacation, imagining the sun glimmering off the waves of 
the Mediterranean while in one’s office, and anticipating how its warm sand will feel under one’s 
feet, are all examples of the mental simulation of an experience. Mental simulations of past, 
future, and alternative experiences share many commonalities including having similar 
developmental trajectories (Suddendorf & Busby 2005), being affected by similar experimental 
manipulations (e.g., Morewedge, 2013; Morewedge, Gilbert, & Wilson, 2005; Nussbaum, 
Liberman, & Trope, 2006), and relying on a common “core network” of brain regions, comprised 
of the medial prefrontal cortex, medial temporal lobe, retrosplenial/posterior cingulate cortex, 
and inferior parietal lobule (Schacter et al., 2008).  
The neural and conceptual systems engaged in mental simulation overlap considerably 
with those involved in the corresponding sensory-motor systems engaged during the 
corresponding behavior being simulated. Evidence from fMRI and TMS studies suggests that 
mental simulations of motor actions, for example, may be functionally equivalent to the pre-
execution stages of those motor actions (Jeannerod, 1994; 2001). Simulations consistently recruit 
the same brain areas as the corresponding executed actions including the supplementary motor 
area (SMA), premotor cortex (PMC), and the primary motor cortex (M1; Munzert, Lory, & 
Zentgraf, 2009). Sensorimotor simulations also comprise the representation of basic conceptual 
information (Barsalou, 2003; 2008). Information is situated in the modalities and contexts in 
which it was originally encountered and is presently relevant. The knowledge that an elephant is 
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large, for instance, is not amodal. It is forever tied to the visual representations through which 
this information was learned. We suggest that the similar systems and processes activated by 
mental simulations and corresponding actions and stimuli may lead mental simulations to 
sometimes serve as a substitute for their experience.  
     
SUBSTITUTION EFFECTS 
 The concept of a substitution effect follows from recognition of humans’ limited 
economic, temporal, and mental resources. Resource allocation in economics, marketing, and 
psychology is likened to a constant-sum game, in which allocation toward one expenditure of 
time, money, or cognitive resources necessitates reduced allocation to other resources serving the 
same goals and needs (e.g., Bass, Pessemier, & Lehmann, 1972; Hamilton et al., 2014; 
Kruglanski et al., 2002). In economics and marketing, substitution effects occur when the 
expenditure of resources such as time or money on two or more alternatives is inversely related. 
As people spend more time on the Internet, for example, the time they spend engaging in face-to-
face social interaction declines (Kraut et al., 1998).  
Goal-directed action has motivational properties that produce substitution effects. 
Planning or engaging in one means to goal pursuit (e.g., running) facilitates the activation of the 
corresponding goal (e.g., getting in shape), but it can inhibit pursuit of that goal by other means 
(e.g., cycling). Similar ideas have been explored in research on eating (Huh, Vosgerau, & 
Morewedge, 2016a), moral licensing (Monin & Miller, 2001), personal control (Inesi, Botti, 
Rucker, Dubois, & Galinsky, 2011), and self-completion theory (Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982). 
When people crave a food that they cannot have, eating a food fulfilling the same consumption 
goal (e.g., snacking) reduces desire for the absent food (Huh et al., 2016a). Psychological 
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substitution effects work similarly. An initial signal of alternative egalitarian or pro-
environmental behavior like endorsing Obama or buying sustainable goods reduces the 
likelihood of other similar actions, like allocating money to minority groups or recycling, 
respectively (Effron, Cameron, & Monin, 2009; Longoni, Gollwitzer, & Oettingen, 2014).  
 We examine a special sort of substitution effect in which mentally simulating an 
experience induces equivalent downstream psychological and behavioral effects as actually 
having the corresponding experience. In the four illustrative cases we present, mental simulation 
of a stimulus or experience produces the same effects as direct exposure to the stimulus or 
experience: (i) mentally simulated events are attributed evidentiary value like their real 
counterparts, (ii) mental practice confers similar performance improvements as physical practice, 
(iii) imagined consumption induces the same habituating effects as actual consumption, and (iv) 
fantasized achievement decreases goal pursuit in ways similar to actual goal achievement (see 
Table 1).  
These (non-exhaustive) cases illustrate the diversity of substitution effects that mental 
simulation may produce. The diverse literatures in which they are located suggest that their 
integration under a superordinate category of substitution effects has the potential to connect a 
broad swath of otherwise disparate research. A superordinate category is justified by the 
observation that each form of mental simulation affects perception, cognition, motivation, and 
action in ways that echo the effects of the experience that is simulated. This straightforward 
premise provides an avenue to reconcile seemingly contradictory findings—why does mental 
simulation sometimes produce more of the simulated behavior and sometimes less, for instance. 
After presenting the four cases below, we discuss predictions and implications of our integration, 
and identify promising new questions for future research in this area.  
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I. SIMULATED EVIDENCE AS SUBSTITUTE FOR PHYSICAL EVIDENCE 
When inferring the probability of a future event, from a successful performance or social 
interaction to having been in a car accident, people rely on their mental representation of the 
event and its similarity to cases with which they are familiar (e.g., Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; 
Morewedge & Kahneman, 2010). Generally, these inferences are informed by evidence and past 
experience. Events that people have observed or lived through seem more likely to happen again 
(Bandura, 1997; Heckhausen, 1991), which is reasonable from a Bayesian perspective. One 
should update beliefs when new evidence is acquired (Viscusi, 1985). People are often 
insensitive, however, to the extent to which the evidence and experiences they accumulate 
accurately reflect their world. By influencing the mental representations of future events, mental 
simulations can convey considerable evidentiary value.    
Vivid, fictional, and imagined evidence has undue effect on estimations of the likelihood 
of future events. Real events that are particularly vivid, such as those that are unusual, negative, 
or have been recently witnessed or experienced, are perceived to provide especially compelling 
evidence, and are perceived to be especially likely to occur in the future (e.g., Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1982; MacInnis & Price, 1987; Risen & Gilovich, 2008). Because a person’s unusual 
past behavior is more memorable than her typical past behavior, for instance, people overweight 
it when predicting her future behavior (Morewedge & Todorov, 2012). People do not disentangle 
the frequency with which they are exposed to events and the frequency with which events occur. 
People who watch more television are exposed to more fictional depictions and factual news 
coverage of violent acts. Consequently, they perceive themselves as more likely to be victims of 
violent crime (Cohen & Weimann, 2000). Moreover, merely mentally simulating an event makes 
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it seem more likely to occur (Anderson, 1983; Carroll, 1978; Gregory, Cialdini, & Carpenter, 
1982; Koehler, 1991; Sherman, Skov, Hervitz, & Stock, 1981).  
Evidence. People attribute evidentiary value to their mental simulations of events, 
whether those events are or are not under their control. Prior to the 1976 Presidential election, 
voters instructed to imagine Carter winning the election predicted that he was more likely to win 
than voters instructed to imagine Ford winning (Carroll, 1978). Similarly, people were more 
likely to predict a major bowl bid for the football team that won the college championship the 
previous year if they were assigned to imagine a good rather than bad season for the team 
(Carroll, 1978).  For controllable behaviors, mental simulations can increase the perceived 
likelihood of the event and the perceived self-efficacy of the thinker. Research participants who 
mentally stimulated donating blood, changing their major, or taking a vacation exhibited 
increases in their expectations of so doing (Anderson, 1983). Participants guided through a 
visualization of perfect execution on a team obstacle course subsequently believed their team 
was more capable of performing at a high level relative to controls (Shearer, Mellalieu, 
Thomson, & Shearer, 2007).  
Subsequent behavioral intentions and behaviors are affected by these simulation-changed 
expectations. Expectancy-value models show that people set and pursue goals whose 
achievement is valuable (e.g., desirable, important) and attainable (Atkinson & Birch, 1970; 
Bandura, 1997; Eccles & Wigfield, 2002). When an achievement is valuable but its attainability 
is unclear—such as a socially anxious speaker giving a presentation at work—people may 
mentally simulate successful accomplishment to convince themselves that this good outcome is 
possible (Buechel & Morewedge, 2013). Competitive athletes report frequently using 
simulations to build motivation and confidence (Hall, 2001; Murphy, Nordin, & Cumming, 
Simulations as Substitutes 9 
2006). Simulating the successful outcome fosters confidence by serving as evidence that this 
outcome will actually happen.  
By heightening expectations of success, simulations can increase the motivation and 
production of the simulated behavior. Imagining successfully interacting with outgroup members 
(e.g., the elderly) leads people to expect to feel less anxious and more relaxed during such an 
interaction, increasing their willingness to actually interact with those outgroup members (Stathi 
& Crisp, 2008; Turner, Crisp, & Lambert, 2007). Consumers who imagined using a cable 
television service saw it as more likely that they would want the service and would subscribe 
than did consumers simply given information about it. Moreover, the former were more likely to 
actually accept a free trial and subscribe when the service was offered (Gregory et al., 1982). In 
short, simulating an experience makes it seem more likely to occur, which can increase 
motivation to produce (desirable) simulated experiences, and thereby increase the chance of their 
production. 
Process. The effect of simulations on expectations has been typically attributed to 
availability. Simulated events are more likely to come to mind at the time of judgment, just as 
events that are experienced, and what readily comes to mind is perceived to be more likely (e.g., 
Hoch, 1984; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). For instance, just as 
vivid demonstrations—those that are recent, unusual, or conveyed by word of mouth—have a 
pronounced effect on expectations (Dickson, 1982), so too do vivid mental simulations (Bone & 
Ellen, 1992; Brown, MacLeod, Tata, & Goddard, 2002; MacInnis & Price, 1987; Sherman, 
Cialdini, Schwartzman, & Reynolds, 1985).  
Availability is not the only process underlying heightened expectations of simulated 
events. The inferences people draw from simulations echo those drawn when witnessing their 
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real counterparts. Generally, people are more likely to attribute the behavior of an actor to 
dispositional influences when they are observers of the behavior than when they are the actor 
who performed it (Jones & Nisbett, 1971). Libby and Eibach (2011) found an analogous effect 
on the inferences about mentally simulated actions. People who imagined a future action using a 
third-person (observer) rather than a first-person (actor) perspective drew more dispositional 
inferences from that simulated behavior, and accordingly, intended to and did engage more in 
corresponding actions (e.g., voting; Libby, Shaeffer, Eibach, & Slemmer, 2007; see also Vasquez 
& Buehler, 2007). Simulations affect expectations about the future because, like actual 
experience, they are interpreted as providing evidence about why and how events will actually 
occur.   
 
II. SIMULATED PRACTICE AS SUBSTITUTE FOR PHYSICAL PRACTICE 
Athletes, patients in physical therapy, musicians, and surgeons all benefit from mental 
practice: visualizing or otherwise mentally rehearsing a motor task in the absence of the 
corresponding physical movement (Driskell, Copper, & Moran, 1994; Munzert, Lorey, & 
Zentgraf, 2009). For instance, a golfer might simulate the basic action concepts – preparation, 
backswing, forward swing, impact, and attenuation – that comprise the more general phases of 
movement involved in the successful execution of a golf putt (Frank, Land, Popp, & Shack, 
2014). Referred to as imaginary practice (Perry, 1939), covert rehearsal (Corbin, 1967), symbolic 
rehearsal (Sackett, 1934), introspective rehearsal, or conceptualization (Egstrom, 1964), mental 
practice is a distinct kind of a broader class of mental preparatory behavior that includes other 
activities such as positive imagery, relaxation techniques, and attention focusing.  
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Evidence. Meta-analyses comparing participants who engage in mental practice without 
physical practice to participants who engage in no mental or physical practice have found that 
mental practice is effective across a broad range of cognitive and physical skill-based tasks 
(Driskell et al., 1994; Feltz & Landers, 1983; Feltz, Landers, & Becker, 1988; Hinshaw, 1991; 
Richardson, 1967a, 1967b). Golf putting, rock climbing, piano playing, and surgery are just a 
few examples of skill-based tasks improved by mental practice (Frank et al., 2014; Hardy & 
Callow, 1999; Meister et al., 2004; Sanders, Sadoski, Bramson, Wiprud, & Van Walsum, 2004). 
A meta-analysis of 35 studies including 65 tests of mental practice effects by Driskell and 
colleagues (1994) found a significant combined mental practice effect that was small to moderate 
in magnitude (r = .26, d = .53, p < .001; Driskell et al., 1994). As is probably true of physical 
practice, mental practice effects on performance are strongest in the short term, and yield no 
appreciable benefit after a few weeks have passed (Driskell, et al., 1994). Mental practice is 
effective for both mental and physical tasks, but tasks for which cognitive activities are critical 
(i.e., perceptual input, mental operations, output and response) show greater mental practice 
effects than tasks requiring physical strength, endurance, and coordination.  
Even though mental practice effectively improves performance, it is not a perfect 
substitute. Mental practice of a task alone is generally less effective than physical practice 
(Driskell et al., 1994). A combination of mental and physical practice, however, can be as or 
more effective in improving task performance than physical practice alone. Research participants 
who mentally and physically practiced putting a golf ball showed more consistent improvement, 
for instance, than did participants who only engaged in mental or physical practice (Frank et al., 
2014).  
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Process. Two processes have been suggested to explain mental practice effects. One 
symbolic process account attributes mental practice effects to the creation or restructuring of 
representational frameworks of complex actions, facilitating their planning through the chunking 
and linking of action units (Driskell et al., 1994; Sackett, 1934). Consistent with this account, 
mental practice appears to facilitate the association of basic action concepts, movement postures 
and the sensations associated with the physical action (Frank et al., 2014).  
A second, functional equivalence account of mental practice effects, suggests that mental 
practice engages covert stages of action, activating the same visual and kinesthetic motor 
programs activated by physical practice, prior to execution of the action itself (Decety, 1996; 
Jeannerod, 1994; 2001). Mental practice is thus purported to entail the practice and subtle 
activation of these covert processes, which is supported by its activation of similar motor-
associated brain regions (e.g., M1), the similar timing of mentally simulated and corresponding 
physical movements, and increases in muscle activity and strength resulting from mental practice 
(for a review, see Munzert, Lorey, & Zentgraf, 2009).  
Recent experiments testing both accounts suggest that mental practice facilitates action 
planning rather than covertly activates the motor programs associated with actions. People need 
to have engaged in physical practice at least once for mental practice to be effective for some 
novel tasks (Mulder, Zijlstra, Zijlstra, & Hochstenbach, 2004). Moreover, mental practice 
inhibits performance of unrelated actions with the body part engaged in practice, suggesting that 
it relies on representation systems involved in planning. By contrast, subtle activation of motor 
programs or muscles involved in the practiced action would suggest that mental practice should 
prime or facilitate unrelated actions with body parts engaged in mental practice (Bach, Allami, 
Tucker, & Ellis, 2014).      
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III. SIMULATED CONSUMPTION AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR ACTUAL CONSUMPTION 
A third case in which simulations have been demonstrated to serve as substitutes for 
experience is that of sensitization and habituation/satiation. Sensitization denotes an increase in 
one’s responsiveness to a stimulus upon initial exposure to it. Seeing and smelling chocolate 
cookies, for example, whets one’s appetite for the cookies. Habituation and satiety denote the 
decrease in motivational and hedonic response, respectively, elicited by a stimulus upon repeated 
or extended exposure to it. One’s motivation to eat and enjoyment of eating a tenth cookie, for 
example, is less than for a first cookie. People and other animals exhibit habituation and satiation 
to a wide variety of appetitive stimuli, such as food, music and television, alcohol, drugs, social 
contact and sexually appealing stimuli (Kavanagh, Andrade, & May, 2005; McSweeney & 
Swindell, 1999).  
Evidence. Imagining sensory cues related to appetitive stimuli can evoke a sensitization 
response similar to actual exposure to those sensory cues. If a person vividly imagines the smell 
of a food, for example, they exhibit increased salivation, a stronger desire to eat the food, and 
greater subsequent actual consumption of the food they imagine smelling (Krishna, Morrin, & 
Sayin, 2014). As does actually eating a food, imagined consumption of a food increases the 
desire for, consumption of, and willingness to pay for complementary foods by activating a goal 
to consume them (Huh, Vosgerau, & Morewedge, 2016b). Imagined and smelt odors have 
similar influences on taste perception (Djordjevic et al., 2004), and lead to the activation of 
similar brain regions (Djordjevic et al., 2005; Simmons, Martin, & Barsalou, 2005). Imagining 
the smell of strawberries, for instance, increases the perceived sweetness of a water solution.  
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The habituating and satiating effects of mental simulation are further evidence that 
mental stimulation can act as a substitute for an experience (i.e., elicit the same responses as 
actual exposure to a stimulus). Habituation and satiation has mostly been demonstrated in cases 
where people (or other animals) are actually exposed to a stimulus repeatedly, which decreases 
how much they want and like the stimulus. New research has shown that the mere mental 
simulation of an experience can similarly lead people to exhibit habituation or satiation to a 
stimulus they imagine consuming. Research participants who first imagined eating 30 M&M’s 
one-at-a-time and then subsequently ate as many M&M’s as they would like from a bowl, for 
instance, actually ate fewer M&M’s from that bowl than did participants who first imagined 
eating 3 M&M’s or no M&M’s (Morewedge, Huh, & Vosgerau, 2010). Imagined consumption 
only reduced subsequent actual consumption when people simulated the actual experience of 
eating the food. Participants in a follow-up experiment only ate fewer M&M’s when they 
imagined eating the M&M’s. Participants who imagined moving 30 M&M’s into a bowl one-at-
a-time did not eat fewer M&M’s than did participants who imagined moving 3 M&M’s into a 
bowl. In other words, imagining an experience only elicited habituation when the experience 
imagined would have elicited habituation.   
People seem to spontaneously mentally simulate appetitive experiences, which may serve 
a preparatory function. Seeing the handle of a cup elicits a simulation of a grasping motion 
(Tucker & Ellis, 1998). Beyond facilitating action performance, spontaneous simulations can 
affect the desire to perform the simulated action. Consumers presented with goods in a manner 
that facilitates the simulation of their consumption perceive those goods to be more desirable 
(e.g., a picture of a cake with a fork positioned so that it can be grasped by their dominant hand; 
Elder & Krishna, 2012). One possibility is that these spontaneously evoked simulations increase 
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the desirability, and thus the likelihood of the simulated actions, by making them easier and thus 
more pleasant to process (Krishna & Schwarz, 2014).  
Habituation and satiation evoked by spontaneous simulation suggest that increased 
desirability through fluency, however, is not the only effect of spontaneous simulation. People 
seem to spontaneously simulate eating a food when they consider how much they would enjoy 
eating it, and whether they would prefer to eat it or a different food. Producing an effect opposite 
of that predicted by processing fluency, people who evaluate or choose between many similar 
food options (e.g., sweet foods) exhibit a decreased desire to eat those foods than do people who 
evaluate or choose between fewer or different foods (e.g., savory foods; Larsen, Redden, & 
Elder, 2013).  
This substitution effect appears to reduce consumption through the same mechanism as 
actual consumption. Like habituation through actual consumption, its effect is reasonably 
stimulus specific. Imagined consumption only reduces actual consumption when people imagine 
eating the kind of food they will later eat. For instance, research participants who first imagined 
eating 30 cubes of cheddar cheese subsequently ate less cheddar cheese than did participants who 
imagined eating 3 cubes of cheddar cheese. However, participants who first imagined eating 30 
M&M’s ate no less cheese than did participants who first imagined eating 3 M&M’s 
(Morewedge et al., 2010).  
Process. The process by which mental simulation induces habituation and satiation has 
not been demonstrated directly. If it is through the same cognitive pathways as actual exposure, 
that process is likely to rely on accessibility in memory. More specifically, when people initially 
encounter a stimulus, the mental representation of the stimulus in the form of a memory node 
may move into a state of high activation and becomes maximally active (an “A1 state”). In this 
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initial state, there is maximal response to the stimulus. Over time the activation of the node 
decays into an “A2 state” in which the node is in a lower level of activation that generates less 
responding to the stimulus. Some priming models suggest this shift occurs as the stimulus 
becomes no longer surprising (Wagner, 1976). When activation has completely dissipated, the 
node moves to an inactive state (I) and there is no responding to the stimulus. Regardless of the 
number of additional exposures, the flow of this is always unidirectional, from A1 to A2 to I. 
Thus, once the node has moved from A1 to A2 from its initial exposure, additional exposures 
will only elicit the diminished A2 responding and the node must cycle through to its inactive 
state (“I”) before additional exposures move it to A1. The amount of time the node is in the A2 
state is then contingent on the short-term memory available to preserve activation in A2. Eating 
another food or attending to a different stimulus, like watching television, will move activation 
more quickly through A2 to I and diminish the amount of time that the node spends in the less 
responsive A2 state (for a more detailed review, see Epstein, Temple, Roemmich, & Bouton, 
2009). 
 
IV. SIMULATED ACHIEVEMENT AS SUBSTITUTE FOR REAL ACHIEVEMENT 
Mentally simulating the achievement of a goal can serve as a substitute for its real 
achievement. Building on Freudian theory, Rapaport (1951) proposed that “fantasy thought may 
reduce drive sufficiently to permit the person to tolerate delayed gratification, thus avoiding 
fruitless impulsive actions” (Singer & Rowe, 1962, p. 446). Delaying gratification by imagining 
the future is useful when pursuing actual gratification would be difficult or problematic (Kappes, 
Schwörer, & Oettingen, 2012; Van Gelder, Hershfield, & Nordgren, 2013). If one’s goal is to 
work out, stick up to the boss, or lose weight, however, imagined success can sometime derail or 
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decrease actual success by serving as a substitute for real goal achievement. If women compare 
themselves to magazine imagery of thin models, they feel overweight. If instead, they imagine 
being the pictured model, positive affect is produced (Tiggemann, Polivy, & Hargreaves, 2009) 
that may counteract the push to embark on an unpleasant diet. Simulating the achievement of a 
desired behavior or outcome can make people feel better, and less likely to pursue goals that are 
difficult or costly to achieve.  
Evidence. Research participants who mentally simulate easily achieving success on tasks 
are less likely to subsequently succeed at those tasks than are participants who imagine failing to 
perform the task, encountering problems, or something entirely different. In one study (Kappes 
& Oettingen, 2011), laboratory participants generated and wrote either positive fantasies (e.g., 
imagine everything during the week goes really well) or realistic descriptions about their 
upcoming week. Their week then unfolded without further intervention. Seven days later, 
participants who had generated positive fantasies reported that their actual week had been worse, 
that they felt less control, and that they had more difficulty managing time, suggesting that the 
success imagery generated several days before interfered with achieving actual success during 
the week. In a different paradigm, both defensive pessimists and strategic optimists performed 
worse on a dart-throwing task following mastery imagery (i.e., imagine flawless performance) 
compared to coping imagery (i.e., imagine correcting mistakes) or relaxation imagery (Spencer 
& Norem, 1996). The same pattern of results held in correlational studies in which the more 
people imagined succeeding rather than failing at goals like losing weight, starting a new 
relationship, or earning a high grade, the less successful they actually were, weeks or months 
later (Kappes, Oettingen, & Mayer, 2012; Oettingen & Mayer, 2002; Oettingen & Wadden, 
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1991; see also Langens & Schmalt, 2002; Sherman et al., 1981, Experiment 1). In short, mentally 
simulating success may sometimes be worse than not thinking about an upcoming task at all.1  
Process. Two processes have been identified that may explain why imagined success 
decreases actual success: its influence on effort and planning. Mental simulations make people 
feel, to some extent, like that event has actually happened. Even psychologically healthy 
individuals can confuse imagination with reality. Imagining and describing experiences that 
never happened can produce convincing false memories of those experiences (Loftus & Pickrell, 
1995), for instance.2 Even when people readily acknowledge that their thoughts do not reflect 
reality—as when they explicitly recognize that they have not yet achieved a goal—simulations 
still affect judgment, emotions, and physiology (Nemeroff & Rozin, 2000).  
If simulation makes it feel or seem that success has been achieved, one may not devote 
effort to produce it. Indeed, imaginary idealized goal achievement reduces effort invested in 
pursuing the simulated outcome (Oettingen & Mayer, 2002). Because simulation evokes the 
physiological consequences of actual experiences, simulated success produces relaxation rather 
than energy. Thirsty participants who fantasized about imbibing a refreshing drink, for instance, 
exhibited a decrease in their systolic blood pressure (Kappes & Oettingen, 2011), an indicator of 
low energization (Wright, 1996). Energy underlies the investment of effort (Brehm & Self, 
1989). This relaxation following fantasies of successful achievement, then, inhibits the effort 
required to achieve outcomes. As evidence, simulating future success reduces engagement more 
                                               
1 It may be more effective to simulate oneself coping with difficulty and mastering challenges 
(i.e., motivational general-mastery imagery) rather than oneself winning events or receiving 
prizes (i.e., motivational-specific imagery). The former is a strategy many successful athletes 
employ (Moritz, Hall, Martin, & Vadocz, 1996).   
2 Ordinary mistakes cross into pathological delusion via failures in so-called “reality testing;” 
delusional depressed and schizophrenic patients are found to use “inappropriately lax criteria in 
evaluating mental experiences” (Radaelli, Benedetti, Cavallaro, Colombo, & Smeraldi, 2013). 
Learning and refining these criteria is a normal part of child development (Subbotsky, 1993). 
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in more effortful tasks (e.g., requiring one hour rather than 5 minutes; Kappes, Sharma, & 
Oettingen, 2013). This is because less motivation is necessary to prompt easy actions. Little 
desire to eat chocolate is necessary to prompt chocolate eating when an open box is nearby (e.g., 
Kavanagh, et al., 2005).  
Mentally simulating goal achievement also decreases actual achievement by thwarting 
effective planning. Simulating possible future obstacles and challenges provides the opportunity 
to make plans to overcome or avoid them (Taylor et al., 1998), which facilitates goal pursuit 
(Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006). Simulated success often omits obstacles and challenges, which 
hampers planning and impairs actually succeeding (Showers, 1992). Reducing planning can also 
increase anxiety about goal pursuit. Having a plan is reassuring and reduces anxiety about 
upcoming challenges. Simulating future success without considering obstacles or challenges may 
leave people unable to make the plans needed to decrease anxiety, letting that anxiety interfere 
with their subsequent goal-achievement efforts (Pham & Taylor, 1999; Showers, 1992).  
 
INTEGRATION 
In the four non-exhaustive cases we examine, mental simulation acts as a substitute for 
the corresponding experience: imagined evidence is a substitute for physical evidence, imagined 
practice is a substitute for physical practice, imagined consumption is a substitute for actual 
consumption, and imagined achievement is a substitute for actual achievement (see Table 1). 
These forms of mental simulation act as substitutes by having similar effects on perception, 
cognition, motivation, and action, as do the corresponding physical experiences.  
Each of the simulation effects we examine is consistent with the effects of the behavior 
that is simulated. To discern whether a particular kind of mental stimulation would act as a 
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substitute for an experience or induce an opposing effect, we suggest that the best indicator 
would be the effect of the corresponding real experience. For instance, just as actual initiation of 
goal pursuit stimulates further goal pursuit (e.g., a Zeigarnik effect), whereas actual goal 
completion turns off goal pursuit, the way goal-pursuit is simulated (e.g., initiated versus 
completed) should moderate the effects of simulation on subsequent real goal-pursuit. Simulated 
goal completion should reduce actual goal pursuit, whereas simulated initiation of goal pursuit 
should increase actual goal pursuit. Simulated tasting of an appetizing amount of food is likely to 
sensitize people to that food (increasing desire and consumption), whereas simulated eating-to-
satiety satiates the desire for the food and decreases its subsequent consumption.  
The duration of substitution effects of mental simulation is an open question. All four of 
the substitution effects we examine involve one or more memory processes (i.e., episodic, 
semantic, procedural). Their effects thus are likely to be stronger initially and dissipate without 
reactivation. The duration and durability of each mental substitution effect is presumably best 
predicted by the duration of the effect of the corresponding behavior. In the case of simulated 
evidence or practice effects, these effects should persist as long as the effects of the 
corresponding real evidence or physical practice persist in memory (Anderson, J. R. 1983). In the 
case of eating or achievement goals, these effects should persist as long as effects of comparable 
eating or achievement would persist—until sufficient time passes and interference occurs for 
people to find a consumed food appealing again, or contextual cues re-set motivation (e.g., 
Epstein et al., 2009; Garbinsky, Morewedge, & Shiv, 2014a; 2014b).     
Mental simulation adheres to classic substitution effects as defined in economics, at least 
in three cases. Mental practice appears to be as efficacious for some skills as physical practice. 
Imagined consumption reduces subsequent actual food consumption, as would actually 
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consuming a food. Imagined achievement appears to have similar physiological and 
demotivating effects as actual achievement. In these cases, mental simulation reduces the 
propensity or need to have the corresponding physical experience. In the case of imagined 
evidence and physical evidence, it is likely that imagined evidence reduces the motivation to 
search for physical evidence (instead of simply serving a supplementary role), but no data yet 
directly supports this prediction.  
Researchers have generally focused on the processes underlying each of these mental 
simulation effects in isolation (cf., Barsalou, 2003; 2008). We hope the organization of these 
simulation effects under a superordinate category, by their overlap in output, may yield insight 
into overlaps in the processes driving them. At a basic level, it is worth examining whether these 
effects are all related to activation in the same core network of brain regions (Schacter et al., 
2008), share similar cognitive properties, and align with regard to the metacognitive inferences 
they imply. It is also important to examine how they diverge. Memory and planning-related 
processes appear to be starting candidates for convergence at a cognitive level, whereas some of 
the simulation effects outlined here diverge with respect to their influence on motivation and 
goal pursuit. People set and pursue goals where success seems valuable and attainable (Atkinson 
& Birch, 1970; Bandura, 1997; Eccles & Wigfield, 2002). Simulation causes outcomes to seem 
more attainable, but can also cause those outcomes to appear less valuable, by making people 
feel like the outcomes have already happened.  
Pragmatically, people seem to recognize the motivation-boosting effects of imagining 
success more than the motivation-dampening effects. For instance, the online companion to the 
best-selling book The Secret (http://www.thesecret.tv/all-stories/) compiles thousands of reader 
testimonials attributing their achievements to the power of positive mental imagery. This 
Simulations as Substitutes 22 
lopsided insight implies that oftentimes people may inadvertently, and ironically, sabotage their 
goal pursuit by imagining successful achievement. Just as people give themselves credit for their 
good intentions (Kruger & Gilovich, 2004), mentally simulating success may allow people to 
feel successful without effortfully pursuing their goals. 
It is worth reiterating that substitution effects are not the only purpose or effect of mental 
simulation. Simulation is used to learn, to decide how to act, and avoid repeating mistakes of the 
past. Indeed, the mental practice we discuss is usually initiated for learning (i.e., improving 
performance). When appropriately guided, simulation may produce effects that counter 
substitution. Simulating how one would have gotten a better grade on a failed exam (e.g., study 
harder, get more sleep) may assist one in achieving better future grades, thereby increasing 
performance motivation in the future. Substitution effects are often unintended, but given their 
broad possible range of consequences, it is particularly valuable to examine them together in an 
overarching framework. 
Whereas simulation is often utilized as a tool to help people increase engagement in an 
avoided behavior (e.g., phobia treatment, Rachman, 1967), efforts to decrease many unwanted 
behaviors rely on thought suppression or avoidance. To prevent cravings for food (Kemps & 
Tiggeman, 2007) or cigarettes (May, Andrade, Panabokke, & Kavanagh, 2010), people are 
guided to engage in tasks that impair mental imagery of the desired item. The findings we review 
in this paper suggests that behavioral change may be more nuanced, that simulating an undesired 
action may sometimes do more to prevent than produce it. Perhaps mental simulation offers an 
alternative route to the sublimation of undesirable goals for those who struggle to enact the 
reappraisals involved in mindfulness meditation (Hölzel, Lazar, Gard, Schuman-Olivier, Vago, 
& Ott, 2011). When simulation substitutes for the need to perform a behavior in reality, 
Simulations as Substitutes 23 
simulation could help reduce unhealthy and harmful behaviors, from helping dieters avoid 
unhealthy foods (Morewedge et al., 2010) to reducing the likelihood of pedophiles enacting their 
harmful urges (see Sheldon & Howitt, 2008). We hope that identifying the cases in which 
simulation serves as a substitute for experience serves as a useful first step in disentangling the 
common thread between these effects, and when they can be effectively implemented.    
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Table 1 
Four Substitution Effects of Mental Simulations 
          
       Mental Simulation    
                 ____________________________________________________________ 
 Evidence Practice Consumption Achievement 
Example Simulate partner 
eating last piece 
of cake: 
 
“Jane could eat 
my piece of 
cake.”  
Simulate steps to 
make a new 
cake: 
 
“…Next, I’ll mix 
in flour.”  
Simulate eating 
many bites of a 
piece of cake. 
 
“I imagine 
vanilla and a 
granular 
texture…” 
Simulate obtaining 
cake at trendy, 
distant bakery:  
 
“I’m going to treat 
myself with an M. 
Antoinette Cake.” 
Substitution 
Effect 
Imagined events 
seem more likely  
 
 
 
“Jane is going to 
eat my piece of 
cake!” 
Mental practice 
improves task 
performance 
 
 
“My cake turned 
out well!” 
Imagined 
consumption 
reduces actual 
consumption 
 
“I no longer 
want to eat 
cake.” 
 
Imagined goal 
achievement 
decreases effortful 
goal pursuit 
 
“The line and trip 
aren’t worth 
braving today.”  
Underlying 
Process 
(1) Increased 
cognitive 
accessibility.  
 
(2) Inferences 
drawn about why 
and how events 
occur. 
Action planning 
facilitated by 
associating 
necessary action 
units. 
Mental 
representation 
of the stimulus 
is activated and 
decays into a 
less responsive 
state. 
(1) Feels like goal 
has been achieved: 
energy drops, 
effort decreases. 
 
(2) Impaired 
planning for 
obstacles. 
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